Deadly Coast Guard Dive: What Went Wrong
The crew of the CGC Healy enjoys some fun on the ice — until they hear the distress call.
On a brisk, sunny afternoon last August, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Healy came to a crunching halt in 4-ft.-thick pack ice, 490 miles north of Barrow, Alaska. The polar icebreaker had just completed the western leg of its summer mission to study the Earth’s crust for the National Science Foundation. Since the ship had been at sea for more than 40 days, the commanding officer, Capt. Douglas Russell, offered the crew a little rest and relaxation: He let most of the 84 sailors and 35 scientists on board disembark for several hours of ice liberty. A few crew members armed with rifles kept watch for polar bears; others played football, drank beer or just milled around.
Lt. Jessica Hill, 31, of St. Augustine, Fla., and Boatswain’s Mate Second Class Steven Duque, 22, of Miami, decided to make an impromptu training dive near the bow of the 420-ft. ship. Both were Navy trained, and considered seasoned divers. However, this would be their first cold-water descent using scuba gear. As the ship’s diving officer, Hill was charged with supervising the dive plan and all personnel involved. This included a third diver, who briefly floated in the 29 F water before climbing out, shivering inside a leaky suit.
Unlike a porous wet suit, a dry suit acts as a barrier between the body and the water, helping the diver withstand freezing-cold temperatures. Air inside the suit affects the diver’s buoyancy. It compresses as pressure increases with depth, reducing buoyancy, and expands as the pressure decreases again near the surface. In order to avoid ascending too quickly, divers often carry extra weight. Hill and Duque each loaded up with an additional 62 pounds.
At 5:45 pm, Hill asked three of her shipmates to serve as diver tenders for the operation. She briefed them on safety protocols and informed them that the maximum depth of each of the two 20-minute dives would be 20 ft.
Three minutes into the training session, Duque’s safety line began to play out quickly. “I had the impression he was swimming away from me sideways under the ice,” Duque’s linesman later told investigators. Within seconds, Hill’s line began to do the same. The third diver returned to the scene 20 minutes later and noticed that too much line had been spent. He ordered the dive support team to “haul ‘em up.” Though other bystanders joined the effort, it took three more minutes to bring Duque and Hill to the surface. EMTs worked for more than an hour to revive them, but it was too late.
Capt. Douglas Wisniewski, who oversees Coast Guard diving operations, spent months analyzing what happened that day. Mistakes had been made at every level of command. The Coast Guard hadn’t checked the scuba equipment in the Healy’s dive locker in five years, nor had it posted a more experienced dive master on board to oversee operations and properly train the dive personnel. (Hill had only 24 dives in her career.) Capt. Russell should never have authorized a dive during a party and without a standby diver. He also should have checked Hill’s dive plan with the Coast Guard Diving Manual, as procedure required. Finally, Hill’s dive plan did not include adequate safety procedures, or sufficient training for the support team.
Wisniewski was unable to determine conclusively why the divers carried such an unusually heavy load (more than twice the recommended amount), and why they failed to drop that weight when they began to descend uncontrollably. Against Coast Guard rules, some of the lead weight had been stashed in zippered compartments, which would have made it difficult to release. The divers also likely succumbed to nitrogen narcosis, a sense of drunkenness resulting from the body’s increased absorption of nitrogen, under pressure.
The real culprit, however, was inexperience. “Hill and Duque simply didn’t have enough dives under their belt,” Wisniewski says. As a result, the Coast Guard is expanding its diver training program: creating new predive checklists, increasing the frequency of dive inspections and examining how to rotate its most experienced divers throughout the fleet. New policies for equipment maintenance and command oversight are also under review.
Dec 12 – 08 – The Coast Guard Responds
Wisniewski believes the most important lesson to be gleaned from this tragedy is to follow the rules: “Those procedures were written in somebody’s blood.” And sadly, so are the new ones.
Treasure Maps 2.0
No matter how many dimensions the directions come in, hunting for underwater gold has gone way beyond the ex-marks-the-spot style of yesteryear. To lead the way, experts at Mel Fisher’s Treasures broke down some of their latest maps.
This 3-D render shows the sea floor that became the final resting place of the Atocha. The mountain-like area is the reef, only 14 ft. below the water’s surface, that was the likely cause of the hole in the ship’s bow (behind the reef, the water drops off into a 100-ft.-deep valley). “The yellow represents where the survey boat actually drove,” says Gary Randolph, vice president and director of operations for Mel Fisher’s Treasures. “We drive over, back and forth, and move over 30 ft. after each run. It’s called ‘mowing the lawn.’”The boat drags a magnometer, which detects iron, just above the ocean floor. The equipment is attached to a cable that, in turn, is attached to a computer, which records iron hits, seen here in red. “We try to keep the equipment as close to the bottom as possible, because the farther away you are, the harder it is to detect small things,” Randolph says. “You can detect an iron ship spike or pin from a couple of feet away, and detect a galleon anchor up to 100 ft. away.” The flat blue areas likely aren’t flat, he says. The company just hasn’t mapped the area yet, and has no data for it.
In this two-dimensional view of the Atocha wreck site, different colors represent the depth of the ocean floor. The bright yellow (bottom) is the shallowest part of the reef, probably where the Atocha hit; light blue represents the outer reef, while the darker blue represents an area of sand called Hawk’s Channel. (The large purple areas haven’t been surveyed.)“The Atocha came in and hit the shallowest part of the reef,” Randolph says. “That punched a hole in the bow. Then she went up the chart and sank, intact.” The red dots represent iron hits. One is the Galleon Anchor, he says, the first anchor that the Atocha dropped when it was sinking. Below the Galleon Anchor are timbers with iron pins and brass spikes—pieces of another, newer wreck, probably from the 1800s. “There was nothing valuable there,” Randolph says. “It wasn’t an intact wreck, just pieces of one that was breaking apart.”
This close-up of the area where the Galleon Anchor was found shows red dots representing iron hits from the magnometer. “The number represents how strong that magnetic target was,” Randolph says. “They’re measured in gammas, which can range from 1 to 2000. One would be a single ship spike or pin; 2000 would be a huge chunk of iron, a modern pipe or something like that.” Galleon anchors register around 500 gammas.
These areas have history and a bright future: Mel Fisher himself found huge amounts of gold and silver from Atocha at “The Main Pile,” and his company continues to find thousands of uncut Columbia emeralds at “Emerald City.” Likewise, the “Grapnel Anchor” stays true to its name. “”It’s where we found a grapnel-style anchor that was on the Atocha and dropped out along this trail as the ship broke up in the second hurricane,” Randolph says.







































